Introduction: democratic accountability in the EU economic governance post-crises: its many faces and potential outstanding gaps

The article introduces the special issue 'Parliaments in times of crises: democratic accountability in the EU economic governance from the euro to the COVID crisis' explaining how it seeks to make a novel contribution in the field of parliamentary studies. It first explains the trajectory of the crisis-driven institutional changes affecting parliaments from the great financial crisis to the COVID pandemic. It then introduces the concept of democratic accountability as a guiding notion of the special issue and differentiates among its various dimensions as well as potential outstanding gaps in the area of EU economic governance. Finally, it demonstrates in what ways particular contributions of this collection address the under-researched questions related to the abovementioned dimensions of EU democratic accountability.

The European Parliament in the Economic and Monetary Union after COVID: towards a slow empowerment?

The European Parliament (EP)'s role in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has always been rather limited. Its prerogatives were somewhat reinforced after the Euro crisis, but its role in policy implementation remained minimal. However, because of the pandemic, the level of integration at the supranational level has significantly increased as a result of, among others, the adoption of unique instruments such as the SURE instrument, Next Generation EU and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF). This article considers to what extent the EP's role in EMU has been reinforced as a result of these measures. It finds that the EP was regrettably reserved only a limited role in the operationalisation of the RRF and an even lesser role in other instruments, but that legal and political constraints made any other outcome unlikely. This article argues in favour of an increased use of the existing instruments by both the EP and national parliaments, as well as a reinforcement of interparliamentary cooperation. A far more extensive empowerment of the EP would be required if temporary and exceptional developments that occurred in the EMU during the pandemic were to become more entrenched.

Towards Increasing Unity and Continuing Executive Predominance Within the E(M)U Post-COVID?

The eurocrisis led to significant reforms being conducted in the field of the European Union's (EU's) Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In this framework, Member States executives, and Heads of States and Governments meeting in the European Council especially, played a key role, although the European Central Bank was long the 'only game in town'. As a result of this and other evolutions witnessed over the past decade, the gap between euro area and EU28(7) appeared to be ever-widening when the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. This article analyses the institutional balance among E(M)U institutions in the immediate response to the pandemic, how this compares to the management of the eurocrisis, and how it may be expected to play out in the implementation of the measures adopted. It finds that, this time around, a wide range of EU institutions and bodies, and the Member States, mobilized swiftly and that Member States executives played a key role again. It also shows that significant trends in favour of greater unity within the E(M)U exist.